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Positive Economics and 
Dismal Politics
The Role of Tax Policy in the 
Current Health Policy Debate
Robert B. Helms
American Enterprise Institute
Those who have participated in this series for several years must
have learned by now that economists do not view the world as others
do.  And those who have participated so far this year must have learned
that this is especially true of those economists who specialize in health
economics.  Given that most of my career has been spent in Washing-
ton, it is my observation that economists play a very small role in the
national health policy debate.  While there is a grain of truth in the
well-worn jokes about economists not being able to reach a conclusion,
the reality is that health policy debates have been dominated through-
out the twentieth century by strong groups of providers who have a
direct stake in the outcome of legislation.  In the last few years these
groups have been joined by other groups claiming to represent “con-
sumers” or specific groups of patients.  All of these participants in the
health policy debate provide ample employment to a new army of poll-
sters and political analysts willing to tell the politicians and the public
what kind of health policies they think we want.  In the midst of all this
noise, the hard-working academic or government health economist,
trained to ask fundamental questions and seek answers based on factual
information, and having earned a reputation for producing overly tech-
nical and dull reports, has a difficult time being heard.  The result is a
political environment that has a higher probability of producing legisla-
tion based on emotion and wishful thinking than on the economist’s
usual standard of economic efficiency.
Nowhere is this danger for bad policy more prevalent than in the
current health policy debate.  Politicians are striving to legislate im-
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provements in medical quality without asking why our current market
arrangements have put too little emphasis on quality and consumer sat-
isfaction.  They are beginning to seek ways to reduce the number of
uninsured without considering the root causes of why most of the unin-
sured choose not to buy insurance.  Legislators are expressing more
concern about the future of Medicare without considering how to get
both consumers and providers more involved in the choice of produc-
tive and cost-effective medical plans and procedures.  It is still my opin-
ion that economists have a positive role to play in guiding health
policies toward more efficient arrangements.  Despite our reputation for
dull reports, health economics is anything but a dismal science.
The purpose of this chapter is to give my own interpretation of a
rather large body of economic literature about how modern medical
markets have developed.  The emphasis will be on the role that tax pol-
icy has played in shaping the distinctive form of health care institutions
and incentives that characterize our market today.  This background
will then be used to comment on various tax policy changes being con-
sidered to make health insurance more available to the presently unin-
sured.
THE POSTWAR HISTORY OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH INSURANCE1
World War II provides a convenient demarcation in the history of
medicine and health insurance.  Numerous advances in scientific
knowledge had been made prior to the war, but these advances were
not generally available to the vast majority of Americans.  Prior to the
war there was little that the average physician could do for the average
patient to change the course of a disease.  That changed dramatically in
the two decades following the war, especially as a result of the devel-
opment of penicillin during the war and more powerful antibiotics after
the war.  These new drugs gave physicians the power to fight infection
and made possible many of the surgical operations that we now take for
granted. New research on medical products and procedures, and the
wide dispersion of this new knowledge to a growing number of health
professionals, made the average person more willing to seek medical
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care than in the earlier part of the century.  The increased availability of
more effective medical care changed expectations about what physi-
cians could do and increased the demand for medical services.  As one
indication of this change, Somers and Somers (1961) reported that
annual hospital admissions per 1,000 population increased from 56.7
during the period 1923–1943 to 99.4 for the period 1957–1958.
Not only was the average citizen more willing to seek medical
care, but they were increasingly able to afford it.  The postwar period is
known as one of rapid growth in population, employment, productivity,
and personal income.  In 1982 constant dollars, disposable personal
income increased from $5,285 in 1945 to $8,944 in 1975, an average
annual growth rate of 1.77 percent over this 30-year period (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1990, table 695). 
The increase in the demand for medical care was accompanied by
a supply response from every factor market in the medical sector.  In
his history of the U.S. hospital sector, William White (1982) reported
that, “Between 1940 and 1965 the total number of general hospitals in
the country increased by nearly 40 percent, while the number of beds
increased by over 85 percent.”   During this same period, the number of
physicians increased 74 percent, while the number of nurses increased
116 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). 
These structural changes in the health care sector also had a strong
effect on the way health care was paid for.  The postwar increase in
medical productivity and the infusion of large numbers of personnel
and capital resources meant that the cost of medical care increased,
both absolutely and relative to average incomes.  The average con-
sumer had a stronger incentive to worry about the cost of medical care
because they faced a higher probability of going into a hospital and uti-
lizing the services of highly trained medical specialists.  This change in
the medical market created a desire on the part of consumers to protect
themselves against the small probability that they would face a large
medical expense.  This increase in the demand for risk avoidance cre-
ated the favorable conditions for the growth of the private health insur-
ance industry following the war.
But, medical science and higher income were not the only forces
attributing to the growth in the health insurance industry.  In fact, tax
policy contributed significantly to both the rate of growth of private
health insurance and many attributes of its structure and performance.
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Again, the role of tax policy in health markets had its origins in World
War II.
Glied (1994) pointed out that the exclusion of health benefits pro-
vided by an employer “existed implicitly since the inception of the fed-
eral income tax in 1913.”  But with almost no demand for health
insurance prior to the war, this provision had little effect until labor
market conditions changed during the war.  In an effort to control the
cost of war production, the federal government established wage and
price controls during the war.  With the expanding demand for labor,
the wage controls created a classic case of excess demand and gave
employers strong incentives to increase fringe benefits and other non-
wage components of employment.  These inducements primarily took
the form of the provision of pensions and health insurance, a practice
that received official sanction by the War Labor Board in 1943.  Field
and Shapiro (1993) stated that, “In a war economy with labor short-
ages, employer contributions for employee health benefits became a
means of maneuvering around wage controls.  By the end of the war,
health coverage had tripled.”   After some vacillation by the IRS fol-
lowing the war, the Congress made the exclusion of employer-based
health insurance from taxable income a permanent feature of tax law in
1954.2
While this special tax treatment for employer-based health insur-
ance was established for other reasons, it ended up having a profound
effect on the development of health insurance and, in turn, on the
development of the entire medical sector.  While other forms of insur-
ance were growing in the postwar period in response to the increase in
consumer incomes and the desire to protect against financial losses, tax
policy caused the health insurance industry to grow primarily by the
growth in group policies rather than individual insurance.  As illus-
trated in Figure 1, group health insurance grew at a much faster rate
than individual insurance in the postwar period covering 158 million
persons relative to 43 million in individual policies by 1970.
 Tax policy increases the demand for employer-based health insur-
ance by making the insurance more attractive relative to wages.  When
wages are taxed and health insurance is not, employees have an incen-
tive to favor additional health insurance over additional wages.  This
discount, or tax subsidy, for the purchase of health insurance is directly
affected by one’s marginal tax rate (MTR), which means that the sub-















Figure 1 Private Hospital Insurance Coverage: Group 
versus Individual, 1940–1970
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).  Employer group is the total
of persons covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (B403) plus insurance com-












sidy is greater for higher-income people than for lower-income people.
This also explains why the total amount of the tax subsidy has
increased over time as increases in income have pushed more employ-
ees into higher tax brackets.  To illustrate, Feldstein and Allison (1991)
found that MTRs for federal taxes in 1969 ranged from 13 percent for
incomes under $1,000 to 36 percent for incomes over $25,000.  They
estimated that the total tax subsidy in 1969 was $2 billion, which
implies a 15 percent discount from $15.7 billion total health insurance
premiums in that year.  In an update of these estimates, Feldstein found
that the tax subsidy in 1978 exceeded $10 billion on insurance premi-
ums totaling $42 billion, which implies a discount of 24 percent. 
Another indication of the growth in the value of the tax subsidy is
the estimates of tax expenditures published by the Congressional Bud-
get Office (1992), which are presented in Table 1.  This study estimated
the actual loss in federal and state tax receipts due to the exclusion of
employer-based health insurance from 1969 through 1990 with projec-
tions for 1995 and 2000.3   These estimates show that since 1969, the
value of the medical expense deduction has declined in importance rel-
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ative to employer-paid health insurance premiums.  The table also
illustrates the dominance of federal taxes over state taxes, although the
MTR of states varies from 0 to 10 percent.  This means that some tax-
payers in the highest federal tax brackets and in some of the high-tax
states may get tax subsidies exceeding 50 percent when they obtain
health insurance through their employers.  While Sheils and Hogan
(1999, p. 179) found that 68.7 percent of tax expenditures in 1998 went
to those with incomes of $50,000 or more, their estimate of an average
family tax expenditure of $1,031 implies that the average family
receives a discount of approximately 2 percent of family income.4
Given the size of this tax subsidy and the fact that it could be
obtained only by purchasing one’s health insurance through one’s
employer, it is not surprising that it had a strong effect on the structural
development of the health insurance industry.  The subsidy gave incen-
tives to employees and their unions to seek relatively more increases in
health insurance benefits than wages since only the latter were taxed.
Policies that covered primarily hospital stays in the 1940s gradually
Table 1 Health Related Tax Expenditures, 1969–2000,a ($, billions)











1969 3.9 0.3 3.6 1.5 1.7
1970 4.0 0.4 3.6 1.5 1.7
1975 8.7 0.8 8.0 3.5 2.3
1980 21.6 1.9 19.7 12.4 3.2
1985 35.9 3.7 32.2 21.7 3.6
1990 50.4 6.3 44.2 32.9 2.8
1995 86.8 9.9 76.8 58.4 4.2
2000 144.0 16.2 127.8 96.3 8.2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (1992).
a Untaxed Medicare benefits, deductibility of charitable contributions, and interest on
state and local bonds for nonprofit hospitals are not included in these data.
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added surgical (major medical) benefits, outpatient physician services,
and later coverage for such routine services as dental care and eye-
glasses.  In addition to the expansion of types of coverage, the degree
of coverage also increased, resulting in higher maximum benefits, cov-
erage of dependents, and lower levels of cost sharing (deductibles and
co-payments).  While such expansions obviously increased both the
number of people covered and the extent of their coverage, they also
had the usual moral hazard effects of insurance, the tendency of people
with insurance to use more of the covered services since they were at
least partially shielded from the effects of the cost of the coverage.5
The result of this tax-induced increase in demand for both health insur-
ance and medical care was an increase in both the quantity and cost of
medical care beyond the levels that could have been expected in a less
distorted market.  Feldstein and Allison (1981, p. 216) concluded their
1972 pioneering study of the effects of the tax treatment of health
insurance by concluding that the subsidy “causes a substantial revenue
loss, distributes these tax reductions very regressively, encourages an
excessive purchase of insurance, distorts the demand for health ser-
vices, and thus inflates the prices of these services.” 
If the tax treatment of health insurance helps explain how we
developed our present system of health insurance with its built-in
incentives for inefficiency, what role, if any, can tax policy play in solv-
ing the policy problems we now face?  The next section turns to this
perplexing issue. 
LIVING WITH AN INEFFICIENT HEALTH CARE 
MARKET: PROSPECTS OF EFFICIENT REFORM
Since economists have been responsible for identifying the distort-
ing effects of tax policy, one would expect that they have also been the
ones proposing changes in the tax treatment of health insurance.  That
has indeed been the case, starting with Feldstein in the early 1970s and
proceeding to the present.6  Except for a brief period when a tax cap
proposal was included in President Reagan’s 1984 budget submission
to the Congress, a serious proposal to substantially reduce the tax sub-
sidy to health insurance has not been proposed by any member of con-
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gress.7   The politics of such a proposal are not hard to understand
given that a relatively large subsidy that has gradually grown in size
and importance over the last 57 years has created strong political sup-
port for the status quo.8   The situation was best captured by Havighurst
(1995, p. 102) when he wrote, 
[A] tax subsidy is insidious precisely because, in addition to being
an off-budget public expenditure, it can misallocate huge amounts
of society’s resources, yet be entirely painless at the level of indi-
vidual producers and consumers.  Since the affected interests sim-
ply adjust their behavior to the incentives created, they have no
occasion to complain or to call for political attention.9
But the world is never static, and the existing policy is creating
other problems that may be changing the reward structure for politi-
cians.  Tax policy, by increasing the demand for health insurance, has
increased the cost of both health insurance and medical care.  In addi-
tion, it has created incentives that have expanded covered benefits and
reduced deductibles and co-payments.  Although tax policy can be
credited with increasing health insurance coverage among the majority
of laborers who are in unions and work for larger firms, it has made it
more difficult for lower-income workers, the self-employed, and those
who are more transitory in their employment arrangements, as well as
the dependents of these workers.  In addition, Pauly and Berger (1999)
have argued that tax policy, by placing the choice of plans and cost-
containment strategy in the hands of employers, has increased employ-
ees’ dissatisfaction with managed care—the so-called managed care
backlash.
These somewhat complicated effects of tax policy have exacer-
bated the main policy problems of cost, lack of coverage, and concerns
about quality that are the central issues in today’s policy debates.  The
policy concepts that are being discussed cover a wide range of ideolog-
ical beliefs about what causes the problem and what policies should be
adopted to correct them.  The specific proposals from each camp reflect
these ideological beliefs.  Liberal proposals have traditionally featured
some form of federal mandates to assure universal coverage, either
mandates for individuals to buy or employers to provide insurance.
But the strong opposition to the mandates in the Clinton health pro-
posal has made even the Democrats leery of this approach.  Instead,
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they now lead with expansions of specific government programs such
as Medicare for the near-elderly, Medicaid for the low-income, and
increased subsidies for safety-net providers treating the indigent.
Expansion of the Medicaid eligibility provisions for children estab-
lished in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP) in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a common feature in President
Clinton’s and Al Gore’s proposals.10
Even among Democrats, direct subsidies to individuals or business
firms are somewhat out of vogue when they cannot be tied into an
existing program such as S-CHIP or traditional Medicaid.  While not
generally opposed to government administration of a program, they do
seem sensitive to the current popular criticism of the ability of federal
and state welfare bureaucracies to effectively run such programs.  For
this reason, some Democrats have turned to tax credits as the most
expedient means to provide subsidies to the uninsured.
Refundable tax credits are the principle subsidy mechanism in two
separate proposals by long-time Democratic advocates for universal
coverage, Congressmen Pete Stark (D., California) and Jim McDer-
mott (D., Washington).11  These two proposals differ in several
respects, but mostly in how they would determine the tax credit.  Rep-
resentative Stark would provide a 100 percent subsidy for the amount
paid for qualified health insurance up to a cap of $3,600 for a family of
four.  It would only be available to those without other forms of cover-
age.  Representative McDermott’s tax credit would be 30 percent of the
amount paid for health insurance limited by the person’s income and
Social Security tax liability.  Of course, the more generous the tax
credit and the more people who are eligible for it, the greater the cost
of the program.  Because Democrats have been less interested than the
Republicans in using federal funds for defense or tax cuts, they have
been more willing to propose more expensive tax credit proposals.
Democratic presidential candidates have developed extensive
health proposals that include tax credits.  Vice President Gore proposed
a 25 percent credit that goes to small businesses whose employees
choose to get their insurance through a purchasing cooperative.  He
also proposed a 25 percent refundable tax credit for people who are not
covered by their employers and purchase individual insurance.12   Sen-
ator Bill Bradley, in addition to providing full subsidies for health
insurance premiums for the low-income, proposed to use income-based
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refundable tax credits as the means for subsidizing both children and
adults.13
Republicans have traditionally been less active than Democrats in
proposing specific health care plans.  They apparently reason that
health care is a Democratic issue and that they are better off politically
playing a defensive role.  But Republicans have been forced by the
public’s demand for solutions to the growing inequities and other prob-
lems in the health care sector to become more active in this field in
recent years.  Proposals based on Medical Savings Accounts (MSA)
and tax credits have been popular with Republicans because they are
seen as ways to promote individual choice without expanding bureau-
cratic control.  Specific tax credit proposals have been introduced by
three Republicans, Representatives Nancy Johnson (R., Connecticut),
Dick Armey (R., Texas), and John Shadegg (R., Arizona).  The tax
credits in these plans are less generous than Stark’s or McDermott’s,
for example, covering 60 percent of the amount paid for health insur-
ance up to a limit of $2,400 for a family in the Johnson plan and 100
percent of the amount paid up to a $1,000 family cap in the Shadegg
plan.14
The Republican presidential candidates face a dilemma when it
comes to health care.  The professional pollsters are telling them that
health care is not an important issue among Republicans voters during
the primaries, but it will be one of the leading issues in the national
elections (Serafini 2000, pp. 336–337).   So far, George W. Bush and
John McCain have made only general remarks about their approach to
health policy and have not come forward with detailed plans similar to
the Bradley and Gore plans.  Many observers believe that because tax
credits were not included in Governor Bush’s tax proposals, they have
already been rejected in favor of a proposal to provide new block
grants to the states for the purpose of expanding coverage to the unin-
sured.  All we know for sure is that his advisers are still working on a
plan to be used in the general election.
Senator McCain has mostly talked about new efforts to expand the
coverage of children through Medicaid and S-CHIP and the expansion
of MSAs and care for veterans (Serafini 2000, p. 337).   His Web site
even contains a proposal to “use the tax code to provide powerful incen-
tives for employers and individuals to obtain affordable coverage.”15
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As yet, there does not seem to be a detailed proposal based on tax cred-
its.
Because winning the nomination in the primaries is the first order
of business for both candidates, it is not surprising that health policy is
not at the forefront of their agendas.  What is important for our pur-
poses is the position occupied by tax credits in the health policy debate.
While both parties have approached health policy from different ideo-
logical directions, the most common feature in the serious proposals to
reform the health insurance market all involve some variation of a tax
credit.  Whether tax credits will turn out to be solid grounds for com-
promise or just another pool of political quicksand has yet to be deter-
mined.  But there seems to be strong opposition to any set of alternative
approaches, be they the expansion of existing programs (Medicare,
Medicaid, or MSAs) or new ideas to expand insurance in the individual
and small-group markets.
ISSUES IN DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE TAX CREDIT FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
If tax credits are to become the basis for a political compromise, a
number of key issues will have to be addressed.  In the last year a rather
large, and in my view overly pessimistic, set of studies about the details
of using tax credits to expand health insurance has emerged.16  Analysis
that is more optimistic is in a distinct minority.17   The following will
not try to debunk all the criticism, but will attempt to identify the issues
and raise the possibility that we now know enough to give tax credits a
try.
The first basic question about tax credits is, will they work?  If the
objective is to induce low-income working employees to choose to buy
health insurance for themselves and their dependents, what kind of
subsidy will it take to persuade a significant number to do so?  And, is
it best to subsidize the small employer, as Vice President Gore pro-
poses to do, or is it best to subsidize individuals, as most of the other
proposals do?  Does the form of the tax subsidy matter?  Are tax credits
more effective than tax deductions?  Should tax credits be refundable?
Should they be a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the cost of
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insurance?  Is the IRS capable of adding such a scheme to an already
complicated tax code?  While all of these questions are difficult, it
turns out that there is some analysis, and even some empirical research,
to give us some answers.
Several elasticity studies have been done about the likely response
of employees to tax subsidies to determine the take-up rate.18  Four of
these studies are illustrated by the four demand curves in Figure 2.
While not drawn to scale, they represent the order of magnitude of the
estimates, ranging from the most inelastic by Chernew, Frick, and
McLaughlin (1997) to the most responsive by Pauly and Herring
(1999).   Based on these elasticity estimates, projections are then made
on the likely response of various groups of people to various tax credit
plans.  The results are difficult to compare because there is not a com-
mon definition of a tax credit proposal and because they use different
assumptions and data to make their estimates.  Still, some useful les-
sons can be learned by comparing the results of three of the studies,
which are illustrated in Figures 3–5.
Sheils, Hogan, and Haught used a price elasticity of –0.203, which,
when applied to national numbers, implies a “loss of coverage for
about 300,000 persons” for a 1 percent  increase in the price of insur-
ance (Sheils, Hogan, and Haught 1999, pp. 56–57).   First, Figure 3
illustrates their estimates of what would happen to the number of unin-
Figure 2 Elasticity Estimates












Current Deductible Tax credit, 30% Tax credit, 50% Tax credit, 80%
sured if a tax deduction were given to those without access to
employer coverage.  The authors then showed the effects of refundable
tax credits of 30 percent, 59 percent, and 80 percent made available to
all those without access to employer coverage.  Their deduction is
assumed to be “above the line”; that is, it is subtracted from adjusted
gross income so it is available to all taxpayers for nongroup premiums,
even those who do not itemize deductions.  They found that for the
year 2000, 12.2 million of the 51.7 million who would be eligible for
the deduction would take the deduction, but that 68 percent of these
would be people who were already purchasing nongroup coverage.
Their relatively low elasticity assumption (compared to the others
below) restrains their estimates of the reduction in the uninsured as the
amount of the credit is increased.  Meanwhile, the higher levels of tax
credits raise the costs to the federal government, from $11.3 billion per
year for the 30 percent credit to $50.3 billion for the 80 percent credit.
They argue that only by eliminating the present tax exclusion and man-
dating individual coverage, as is done in the Heritage plan, can univer-
sal coverage be achieved at a more reasonable cost to the federal
budget. 19
Figure 3 Estimated Tax Subsidy Effects in 2000





























The next set of estimates are by Jonathan Gruber, who estimated
the effects of a tax deduction and different types of tax credits on vari-
ous classes of insured and uninsured people.20  Gruber used a base elas-
ticity of –0.625, somewhat more responsive to price changes than that
assumed by Sheils.  But he also adjusted this elasticity down for lower-
income persons.21  To reflect the low participation in other tax credit
programs, he also assumed that only 50 to 90 percent of those who are
now buying nongroup policies will take advantage of the new tax cred-
its.
For display purposes, in Figure 4, I have subtracted Gruber’s esti-
mates of the reduction in the number of the uninsured from the
43,450,000 uninsured used by Sheils, Hogan, and Haught.  His results
for the tax deduction were consistent with Sheils, showing very modest
effects.  As he explained, this is not surprising since the deduction is
worth very little to those with low incomes.  The three tax credit pro-
posals illustrated in Figure 4 are all refundable but are assumed to
apply for only nongroup insurance.  But, since all persons are assumed
to be eligible, each of these has a strong effect on inducing people with
Figure 4 Estimated Tax Subsidy Effects in 1999a
SOURCE: Gruber (2000), Tables 1A, 3A, 6A, and 7A.
aThese estimates assume the tax credit is refundable and is for nongroup policies only, but
























group insurance to switch to the nongroup market.  In the most gener-
ous case of a tax credit of $2,000 for an individual and $4,000 for a
family, Gruber estimated that almost 14 million people who previously
had group insurance would switch to the nongroup market.22   Although
not illustrated in Figure 4, he also finds that this switching out of group
policies would be reduced to only four million if the credits were
restricted only to those not presently offered health insurance.23
Pauly and Herring (1999) concentrated their analysis on the 32.3
million workers and their dependents who are uninsured, the part of the
population that tax credits are primarily designed to reach.  They
argued that their estimates are substantially different from other esti-
mates because the elasticities used by Gruber, Sheils, and others have
been obtained from studies of other working populations that are pre-
dominantly higher income than the low-income population tax credits
are designed to help (Pauly and Herring 1999, p. 2 and p. 14).24   As
illustrated in Figure 5, they provide separate estimates of three levels of
tax credits showing the results separately for those below and above
300 percent of the federal poverty level.  No restrictions or caps are
placed on eligibility for the credits.
Figure 5 Effects of Tax Credits on the Uninsured
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Pauly and Herring (1999) drew several conclusions from their esti-
mates, most of which can be seen in Figure 5.  First, refundable tax
credits are going to be more effective on the low-income than on
higher-income because they are, by design, targeted more toward low-
income people.  A given percentage credit will have a stronger effect
on the low-income compared to higher-income because it will move
more of them over their “reservation price” and give them a reason to
make a decision different from the one they had made without the sub-
sidy.  But, low levels of subsidy will not be as effective at higher
incomes because most people who have already made a decision not to
buy insurance will not be induced to change their minds until they see a
substantial difference in their cost of insurance.  Pauly and Herring
reached the same conclusion as Sheils and Gruber—that small tax
credits are not likely to have a large effect on the number of the unin-
sured.  But unlike the previous studies, they found that higher levels of
subsidy could have substantial effects on the uninsured, especially the
low-income uninsured.  Assuming a 40 percent loading factor, their 50
percent tax credit reduces the uninsured by 45 percent; if a larger indi-
vidual insurance market would reduce loading factors to 30 percent,
they estimate that the number of uninsured would decrease by 80.5 per-
cent (Pauly and Herring 1999, table 2).25  They also estimated that a tax
credit equal to two-thirds of the premium would reduce the uninsured
to zero (Pauly and Herring 1999, table 2, note c). 
A common conclusion from these studies is that tax credits will be
more effective than a tax deduction in reducing the number of unin-
sured, and a refundable tax credit will be more effective than a flat dol-
lar tax credit in reaching relatively more of the low-income.  In
addition, there seems to be agreement that low levels of tax credits will
have relatively small effects.  There is less agreement about both the
effects of high levels of tax credits and the policy prescription that tax
credits should be our next major initiative in health policy.  Gruber
(1999) has proposed that we conduct a large and relatively sophisti-
cated demonstration in order to learn more about what it will take to
change our tax-subsidized health insurance market.   Pauly and Herring
(1999) have reminded us that we presently give large tax subsidies to
most U.S. workers, so we should not look at a policy that shifts these
subsidies as necessarily a net loss in economic efficiency.  A policy that
both increases government expenditures and decreases government
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revenue may have distributional effects without imposing a real eco-
nomic loss (Pauly and Herring 1999, p. 3 and p. 27). 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS AND DISMAL POLITICS
To paraphrase one of the oldest jokes about economists, we have
now lined up end-to-end all the economists working on tax credits and
they can’t reach a conclusion.  So, one might ask, if the economists can
not agree, how would we ever expect politicians to agree?  The answer
is that tax credits might become the basis for a political compromise to
expand health insurance coverage if enough politicians believe that
there is no chance to get the alternative policies they prefer.  The next
election of the president and the congress will have a big influence on
that possibility.
Without having a comparative advantage in making political pre-
dictions, let us look at three possible outcomes.  The first is that the
Republicans win both the White House and the House of Representa-
tives (the Senate is assumed to remain in the hands of the Republicans
in all three cases).  This result will likely bring about less overall inter-
est in health policy, and certainly not much interest in achieving univer-
sal coverage.  There will be some interest in expanding the use of
MSAs, health marts, and block grants to states, but there will not likely
be enough agreement on premium support to do much about Medicare.
The Republicans are likely to try to pass some low-cost, income-based
prescription drug benefit for Medicare.  Their interest in cutting taxes
and controlling the growth in federal expenditures will not leave much
room for expensive new health programs like tax credits.
The second outcome to consider is that the Democrats win both the
White House and the House of Representatives.  Even without control
of the Senate, they will be in a position to carry out a substantial part of
their agenda, including expansions of S-CHIP to families of uninsured
children, higher income eligibility for Medicaid, and more direct subsi-
dies to safety-net providers.  More likely too would be an expansive
Medicare drug benefit and a patient protection act with a strong right to
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sue.  Expanding insurance coverage in the private sector through com-
plicated and expensive tax credits are not likely to be very popular.
The third possibility is, of course, that party control is split
between the White House and the House of Representatives.  Regard-
less of how this happens, and assuming that one party does not gain the
power to overcome a veto, it leaves us in somewhat of a political stale-
mate, not unlike the situation we have mostly been in for the last 20
years.  In such a situation, neither party has the ability to carry out its
preferred agenda.  Tax credits, which already enjoy some bipartisan
support, might emerge as the basis for action, but only if there is a
strong desire to do something about private coverage.  Two current
trends, if continued, could help bring that about.  If the cost of health
care and health insurance premiums continue to increase, this could
increase the number of the uninsured as some employers drop coverage
and others cut back on the proportion of the premium that they cover,
causing more employees to decline coverage for themselves and/or
their dependents.  In addition, if more firms decide to convert to a
defined contribution approach, this could improve the efficiency of the
individual market, making the cost-effectiveness of a tax credit
approach more acceptable to the Congress.26
That is anything but a definitive prediction, but I have lived in
Washington too long to have much faith in anyone’s ability to predict
the future of political events.  If politicians decide that tax credits are
the only way to achieve a desired political objective, then there is
enough positive economic analysis around to tell them how to make
them work.  If they were accompanied with some limit on the tax
exclusion, we could make a faster start on the road back to a more effi-
cient health care market.  Politics at this time is too dismal for that
much change.
Notes
1. This section draws heavily on Helms (1999).
2. This history is discussed in more detail in Helms (1999), pp. 9–12.
3. Sheils and Hogan (1999) provide later estimates of tax expenditures for 1998 that
seem consistent with the Congressional Budget Office projections.  For 1998, they
estimated state tax expenditures of $13.6 billion and federal tax expenditures of
$111.2 billion.
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4. Computed by dividing the average family tax expenditure by average family
income of $51,855, the latter coming from U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical
Income Tables: Experimental Measures,” Table RDI-1, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/histinc/rdi01.html.
5. For readable explanations of the basic economics of insurance, see Hall (1994),
especially Chapter 2, and Pauly (1980), pp. 201–219.
6. For examples of proposals placing emphasis on capping or eliminating the tax
exclusion, see Feldstein (1971); Pauly et al. (1992); Butler (1992); Steuerle
(1993); and Arnett (1999).
7. The Administration’s proposal was sent to Congress on February 28, 1993, and
introduced as, “The Health Care Cost Containment Tax Act of 1983,” S.640.
8. For one defense of the present system, see Custer, Kahn, and Wildsmith (1999).
9. Havighurst also says, “. . . capping the tax subsidy is a notion that only a policy
wonk could love, a meritorious policy idea with no natural political constituency,”
p. 103.
10. One-third of the 25 million low-income uninsured are children (Kaiser Commis-
sion on Medicaid and the Uninsured 1999).
11. A more complete description of these and other current tax-related proposals can
be found in Weiss and Garay (2000).
12. Http://www.algore2000.com/agenda/agenda_healthcare.html, pp. 3–4.  Accessed
February 2000.
13. Http://www.billbradley.com/bin/article.pl?path=280999/3.  Accessed February
2000.
14. The Armey plan covers 100 percent of the amount paid up to a cap of $3,000 for a
family of four (Weiss and Garay 2000, p. 8).
15. See Health Care, p. 10, at http://63.224.30.9/issues/qna.html.
16. For examples of this literature, each of which contains useful analysis and data,
see Blumberg (1999); Meyer, Silow-Carroll, and Wicks (2000); Gruber and Levitt
(2000); and Salisbury (1999).
17. For more positive views of tax credits, see Steuerle (1993); Pauly et al. (1992);
Butler (1992); Pauly (1999); and Butler and Kendall (1999).
18. Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997); Sheils, Hogan, and Haught (1999); Gru-
ber and Levitt (2000); and Pauly and Herring (1999).
19. Sheils, Hogan, and Haught (1999), executive summary-1.
20. These estimates are summarized in Gruber and Levitt (2000), but the information
here is taken from Gruber’s (2000) technical report.
21. Gruber (2000), p. 38.
22. Gruber (2000), table 7A.
23. Gruber (2000), table 4A.
24. Pauly and Herring (1999) also make estimates assuming a 30 percent loading fac-
tor in the nongroup market, but only the more restrictive 40 percent assumption is
shown in Figure 4.
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25. For a discussion of how an expanded individual market could lower loading fac-
tors and improve the risk pooling function of insurance, see Pauly, Percy, and Her-
ring (1999).
26. For a recent account of the interest in a defined contribution approach, see Win-
slow and Gentry (2000).
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